Abstract: Capital flows to Latin America have been mostly determined by push factors (global ones) rather than by pull factors (associated with domestic factors). After a succession of currency crises, Latin American countries adopted a floating exchange regime but at the same time have made use of foreign exchange reserves accumulation policy in order to reduce the effects of capital flows volatility. More recently, capital inflows to Latin America have increased substantially. The response of governments, however, has differed between countries. This paper aims at analyzing the causes and consequences of the recent capital flows boom to Latin America, focusing on the major countries of the region. Going in this direction, it tries to answer the following questions: What are the specific determinants and features in the recent wave of capital inflows to Latin America? Why did Latin American countries succeed in facing the contagious of the 2007-08 international financial crisis? How have Latin American major countries managed the recent intensive wave of capital flows?
Introduction
Capital flows to emerging economies have followed a markedly pro-cyclical global pattern and tend to exacerbate economic booms, when they do not cause them.
Empirical literature shows evidence that capital flows to Latin America have been mostly determined by push factors (for instance, economic policy of the developed countries) rather than by pull factors (associated with domestic factors). After a succession of currency crises, most Latin American countries adopted floating exchange regime but at the same time have made use of foreign exchange reserves accumulation policy in order to reduce the effects of capital flows volatility.
The 2007-08 international financial crisis, that induced the 'great recession', has substantially changed the dynamic process of the world economy. The Latin America countries are no exception. The financial crisis generated mechanisms by which it was transmitted to these economies, including: (i) withdrawal of portfolio capital and foreign direct investment (FDI); (ii) interruption of credit, particularly for foreign trade; (iii) falling commodity prices; (iv) declining exports to developed countries; (v) volatile exchange rates; and (vi) rising levels of profit repatriation by transnational corporations.
As a result, governments of developed and emerging economies have responded to the 2007-08 international financial crisis and 'great recession' with massive fiscal and monetary stimulus, by rescuing financial and non-financial corporations and by reintroducing a more hands on approach to deal with the economic problems (GriffithJones et al., 2010; Arestis et al., 2011) . In Latin America countries, alongside the countercyclical policies aimed at smoothing the negative impacts of the external environment, some central governments have been trying to implement more active developmental policies. Besides this brief Introduction, the chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2 discusses the relationship between financial globalization, capital flows and economic policy in emerging economies. Section 3 analyses the adoption of 'Washington Consensus' policies during the 1990s in Latin America, as well as the implementation of the 'New Consensus Macroeconomics' policies in an important group of countries. Section 4 focuses on the recent trends and features related to capital flows, external vulnerability and economic policy in Latin America. Section 5 analyses specifically the contagious of the 2007-08 international financial crisis in Latin America and the economic policy responses. Section 6 shows some economic policy implications of the surge of capital inflows in the region. Finally, section 7 summarizes the paper.
Financial globalization, capital flows and economic policy in emerging economies
Financial globalization is a phenomenon that has been intensified since the 1970s in consequence of a set of factors that includes: (i) the development of eurodollars market, that was the 'embryo' of the international and de-regulated financial markets; (ii) the end of the Bretton Woods system, with the end of the fixed but adjustable exchange rate regime; (iii) the development of technological innovations in telecommunication and informatics that allowed a faster data computing and an online integration of different geographic regions; and (iv) the financial de-regulation that happened initially under the context of the adoption of neo-liberal policies in the United States and United Kingdom and elsewhere. In other words, financial globalization is a process in which there is a greater integration among financial markets and capital flows cross-border at the global scale, a certain tendency to the erosion between countries' borders, and an increase in the volume and velocity of financial resources in the international financial market. Other dimensions of financial globalization include: (i) the loss of hegemony of the banks as the main providers of finance to firms due to the growth of corporative securities market; (ii) the rising of big institutional investors, such as pension funds, investment funds, insurance firms etc. as important demanders of securities; (iii) the spread of new financial instruments, such as debt securitization and derivatives; and (iv) the formation of financial conglomerates and brokers with global power (Ferrari-Filho and Paula, 2004) . Stiglitz (2000) states that capital flows in emerging countries are markedly procyclical and exacerbate economic booms, and that financial liberalization exposes countries to the vicissitudes associated with changes in economic circumstances outside the country; so that such economies are exposed to sudden change in lenders' and investors' perceptions. Such shifts can increase capital outflows. According to Stiglitz (2000) : "capital market liberalization is systematically associated with greater instability, and for good reason: capital flows are markedly pro-cyclical, exacerbating economic fluctuations, when they do not actually cause them (…) In addition, capital market liberalization exposes countries to vicissitudes associated with changes in economic circumstances outside the country: a sudden change in lenders' perceptions concerning "emerging market risk" can lead to huge capital outflows, undermining the viability of the entire financial system" (p. 1080).
One of the major drivers of capital inflows during the beginning of the 1990s boom and during the 2000s capitals flows' boom was the low interest rates in developed economies. Capital flows volatility can translate into huge macroeconomic instability in the domestic economies of main Latin American countries, complicating in particular the macroeconomic management and entailing tradeoffs in attaining macroeconomic objectives (economic growth, financial stability, price stabilization, avoiding exchange rate appreciation etc.). Indeed, "large surges in capital inflows can lead to strong upward pressure on the exchange rate and contribute to macroeconomic overheating, widening current account imbalances through an appreciating exchange rate as well as inflationary pressures and asset price bubbles to the extent that a nominal exchange rate appreciation is resisted and monetary sterilization is either not undertaken or is ineffective. The financial sector generally plays an important role in amplifying these asset price bubbles, and can exacerbate macroeconomic cycles" (Ghosh, 2010, p. 2) .
Some analysts stress that with the financial liberalization and the emergence and spread of new financial instruments (such as derivatives), the likelihood of occurrence of speculative financial operations increases substantially. Tobin (1978) , for instance, states that the main macroeconomic problem related to integrated financial markets is not the choice of the appropriate exchange rate regime but the excessive short-run capital mobility that reduces the autonomy of national governments to pursue domestic objectives with respect to employment, output and inflation. According to Tobin (op. cit.) , "the mobility of financial capital limits viable differences among national interest rates and thus severely restricts the ability of central banks and governments to pursue monetary and fiscal policies appropriate to their internal economies" (p. 154). In the same contribution, Tobin also doubts whether a flexible exchange regime is a panacea: "I believe that the basic problem today is not the exchange rate regime, whether fixed and floating. Debate on the regime evades and obscures the essential problem. That is the excessive international -or better, inter-currency -mobility of private financial capital." (p. 153).
In contrast with financial markets closed to foreign capital, capital flows in liberalized markets can have disruptive action on countries, damaging the autonomy of domestic macroeconomic policies, and even generate speculative attacks on domestic currencies. As Eichengreen et al. (1995) state, "volatility in exchange rates and interest rates induced by speculation and capital flows could have real economic consequences devastating for particular sectors and whole economies" (p. 164). In other words, financial globalization has been a source of broader instability related to the occurrence of currency crises and speculative attacks, and also of the reduction in the degrees of freedom in the implementation of a more autonomous economic policy. Indeed, under the action of 'global players', in a more liberalized and integrated market, the operational way of working of the financial markets became a sort of big and global casino. The high capital mobility of today's global economy has increased the arbitrage and speculative transactions in foreign exchange markets (Alves Jr. et al, 1999 .
Recent empirical studies undertaken by the IMF (2011b) and other economists, such as Cardarelli et al. (2009) , found some findings that are line with Stiglitz (2000) analysis of the effects of the capital flows to emerging economies:
(a) Volatility of capital flows has increased over time and fluctuations in net flows are much sharper for emerging economies compared with developed economies -in the latter, gross outflows largely offset gross inflows, generating smoother movements in net flows. By contrast, in emerging economies, gross inflows and net flows both fell dramatically during the crisis and rebounded sharply afterward (IMF, 2011b, p. 125) .
(b) Episodes of large capital inflows are associated with acceleration of GDP growth, but afterwards growth often drops significantly: over one third of the completed episodes ended with a sudden stop or a currency crisis, what suggests that abrupt endings are not a rare phenomenon (Cardarelli et al., 2009, p. 5) . Thus, there is an inverted V-shaped pattern of net capital flows to emerging economies outside the policymakers control (IMF, 2011b) .
(c) Fluctuations in GDP growth have been accompanied by large swings in aggregate demand and in the current account balance, with strong deterioration of the current account during the inflow period and sharp reversal at the end (Cardarelli et al., 2009, p. 5 ).
(d) The surge of capital inflows also appears to be associated with a real effective exchange rate appreciation, damaging the competitiveness of export sectors and potentially reducing economic growth (Cardarelli et al., 2009) .
(e) Historically, portfolio flows have been more volatile and their volatility has recently risen. Bank flows have historically been less volatile but their volatility rises sharply around crisis times FDI is only slightly more stable than other types of flow for emerging economies, and its volatility has increased recently due to increase of direct borrowing by a firm subsidiary (IMF, 2011b) . Greenville (2000) states that the problems related to the exchange rate volatility are greater for emerging economies due to the following reasons: (i) they have no long historical experience of market-determined exchange rate; (ii) there are few 'Friedmanite' stabilizers speculators acting in the exchange market, that is there has been a lack of players willing take contrarian foreign exchange positions in emerging countries; 1 (iii) exchange markets are prone to exhibiting herd behavior generating swings in the exchange rate; (iv) these economies have much larger and volatile capital flows, in relation to the size of their capital markets and economies more generally; and (v) fundamentals cannot explain the behavior of the exchange rate over a short/mediumterm horizon.
Exchange rate volatility in general is higher in emerging economies than in developed ones as the former have small and less liquid foreign exchange markets that make such economies more vulnerable to one-way expectations and herd behavior.
Indeed such economies face problems related to the 'asymmetric financial integration'
as they have much larger and volatile capital flows compared to the size of their capital market and economies more generally. That is markets in emerging economies are thin and subject to a high degree of uncertainty and information asymmetries. Foreign exchange markets in most emerging countries continue to be relatively small and less liquidity than their counterparts in the industrial world. Countries with high debts, currency mismatches and/or fragile financial sector are particularly vulnerable (Moreno, 2005) . Furthermore, the benchmark used to evaluate the performance of managers of global investors portfolio does not include financial assets in emerging economies; so, " [they] can reduce or eliminate their positions quickly, at any signal of deterioration of expectations, or due to new and more attractive opportunity for investment in advanced markets or increase in the investors' risk aversion (Freitas and Prates, 2001, p. 83 ).
In particular, exchange rates can influence inflation ('exchange rate passthrough') through the prices of traded final goods and imported intermediate goods, and their impact on agents' inflation expectations. Ho and McCauley (2003) show evidence that: (i) domestic income is negatively and significantly correlated with pass-through as lower-income economies have a larger portion of traded goods in the consumption basket; (ii) "exchange rate pass-through has tended to be stronger in Latin America than in Asia even though Latin American are not necessarily more open than their Asian counterparts" (p. 6). The explanation for such difference is that countries with histories of high inflation -as is the case of many Latin American countries, especially in the 1980s -are more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations, probably due to the existence of an inflationary memory (Eichengreen, 2002) . Thus, considering the important influence of the exchange rate on domestic inflation in these economies, exchange rate considerations can be expected to play a more prominent role in emerging economies.
One important discussion in the literature about macroeconomic issues in emerging economies is which exchange rate regime is more appropriate for these economies. On the one hand, according to the 'bipolar view', intermediary regimesthat involve all sorts of intermediary exchange rate regimes between a freely floating regime and a fixed exchange rate regime -are less appropriate for economies with substantial involvement in international capital markets. The main argument is that such exchange rate regimes make countries more vulnerable to speculative attacks (Fischer, 2001 ). On the other hand, the view called 'fear of floating' points out that many emerging economies that adopted flexible exchange rate regime in practice sought to limit exchange rate movements. Such resistance to floating arises from their low policy and institutional credibility and high degree of pass-through of exchange rate changes into domestic prices, among other factors (Calvo and Reihart, 2002) 2 . Other reasons as to why monetary authorities seek to limit exchange rate movements are related to the effects of excessive exchange rate volatility (mainly devaluation) on the outstanding foreign currency debts of banks and the corporate sectors with un-hedged foreign currency liabilities, and also on governments with large foreign currency debt or debt indexed to the exchange rate, raising questions about their fiscal sustainability. In addition, exchange rate fluctuations may generate uncertainties that could impede trade.
For instance, prolonged real appreciation associated with large capital inflows can adversely affect export competitiveness and investment in the external sector (BresserPereira and Gala, 2007) .
Some flexibility in the way the floating exchange rate is managed can be helpful in absorbing the capital inflow, in buffering external shocks, and responding to the changing productive capacity of their economies; it can also inhibit some short-term 2 Emerging economies as a group have a higher pass-through than developed economies since lowerincome economies have a larger portion of traded goods in the consumption basket so that the significance of the exchange rate in the evolution of domestic inflation tends to be greater in such economies (Ho and McCauley, 2003) .
flows, by serving as a constant reminder that exchange rate volatility can outweigh the interest rate advantage of foreign currency borrowings (Grenville, 2000, p. 59 ).
Moreover, a sort of administered floating exchange rates regime can be useful if the objective of the central bank is to reduce the exchange rate volatility and also influence somehow the real exchange rate for international trade purposes. Central bank intervenes in foreign exchange markets to achieve a variety of macroeconomic objectives, such as controlling inflation, maintaining competitiveness and/or maintaining financial stability. Differently from a pegged exchange rate, authorities' interventions to limit exchange rate movements may not target a certain level of the exchange rate but may influence its path and/or volatility.
In order to enhance the possibility of a successful management of exchange rate regime in emerging economies some measures to reduce the volatility of capital flows and the likelihood of speculation attack on domestic currency are necessary. One possibility is the use of official intervention in the foreign exchange market, which may exert direct influence on nominal exchange rate as it alters the relative supply of domestic and foreign currency assets. On the one hand, the countries' ability to resist currency depreciation is limited by its stock of foreign exchange reserves and its access to potential credit lines. Thus, reserve accumulation can be seen as an insurance against future negative shocks and speculation against domestic currency, as emerging economies have limited access to the international capital market. On the other hand, the ability to avoid currency appreciation may require the use of sterilized intervention.
Monetary authorities have often sought to sterilize impact of foreign exchange intervention through open market operations and other measures, such as increasing bank reserve requirements. If central banks have a target for the short-term rate, then they can attempt to offset increases in bank reserves selling domestic assets or issuing their own securities (Mohanty and Turner, 2006) . Moreover, sterilization often implies quasi-fiscal costs, as it in general involves the central bank exchanging high-yield domestic assets for low-yield foreign reserves (Cardarelli et al., 2009 (Epstein et al., 2003, pp. 6-7) . Capital controls can be used for different though related objectives, such as: (i) to reduce the vulnerability of a country to financial crises, including capital flight during currency crisis; (ii) to drive a wedge between onshore and offshore interest rates in order to provide monetary authorities with some policy autonomy at least in the short-run; and (iii) to maintain some shortterm stability of nominal exchange rate and to reduce exchange rate pressures derived from excessive capital inflows. Capital controls may be limited and temporary, that means that they should be used in the magnitude necessary to be effective, and dynamically adjusted to compensate the tendency of financial systems to elude them. Magud and Reihart (2006) review more than 30 papers that evaluated capital controls either on inflows or outflows around the world (the evaluation excludes countries with comprehensive capital controls, such as China and India), making use of a capital controls effectiveness index in order to standardize the results of the empirical studies. They conclude that "capital controls on inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent; alter the composition of capital flow; reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the evidence is more controversial)", but "seem not to reduce the volume of net flows (and hence, the current account balance)", while "limiting private external borrowing in the 'good times' plays an important prudential role because more often than not countries that are 'debt intolerant'" (pp. 26-27) . Based on this, Magud and Reihart (2006) argue for enhancing the effectiveness of controls by taking into account country-specific characteristics in their design.
To sum up, set against the adoption of orthodox economic policies is the perceived need to preserve the autonomy of developing countries' fiscal and monetary policies. This has reinforced the opinion of heterodox economists and some policymakers of the necessity of introducing capital controls and an exchange rate regime that prevents exchange rate fluctuations. These economists argue that such policy autonomy is fundamental to assure sustainable economic growth and harmonious social development. This is particularly important given that emerging economies suffer from more volatility than developed countries and this contributes to recessions of longer duration (Hausmann et al, 2004) . reform, Brazil adopted a more gradual approach to reform. Moreover, most countries experimented with a quick and deep process of capital account liberalization, including portfolio capital liberalization for both residents and non-residents.
'Washington
The results of the implementation of the Washington Consensus strategy were somehow disappointing, in particular in reference to economic growth and financial stability. Argentina, considered by IMF during the 1990s as an example of success of the Washington Consensus strategy, was in fact an enormous failure. The Washington Consensus was criticized in various aspects by Stiglitz (1999) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005) , such as: domestic financial liberalization caused in various countries banking crisis; capital account openness stimulated frequently speculation on domestic currency and currency crises, even when economic fundamentals were fine, and had negative effects of real variables (output and employment); privatization failed in some countries because, on the one hand, it was not followed by economic policies for the promotion of competition and it did not improve the market efficiency; and the excessive focus on inflation control was in some cases harmful to growth.
According to Kregel (2008) , the Washington Consensus policies in Latin America during the 1990s implemented domestic policies (exchange rate anchor, high interest rates, and financial liberalization) that hindered the domestic productive and technological re-structuring that could contribute to boost economic and employment growth in the region. Moreover, price stabilization plans with the use of some exchange rate anchor were implemented in some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru.
As is well known, experience with stabilization programs involving some kind of exchange anchor shows that, generally speaking, such plans at first generate an abrupt drop in the rate of inflation, accompanied by marked appreciation in the exchange rate. The local currency appreciated in real terms as a result of differential evolution by domestic and foreign prices in a context where the nominal rate of exchange remains stable, causing the balance of payments current account to contract substantially, due principally to the increase in the value of imports. Normally, the resulting deficit is accompanied by a large capital account surplus, thus not only enabling the former to be financed, but allowing the volume of the country's international reserves to grow. The latter increase occurs as a result of the surge of foreign capital entering the country drawn by the stabilization plan's initial success, combined generally with liberal structural reforms (Ferrari-Filho and Paula, 2003) .
Higher domestic interest rates, an added attraction to external financing, are normally used to reinforce these factors still further. The introduction of tight monetary policies and greater freedom for foreign investors create an interest rate differential sufficiently large to attract arbitrage capital inflows. The increasing influx of foreign capital, however, can lead to a still greater real appreciation of the exchange rate, leading to a further increase in imports and also a downturn in exports. Thus, the need to maintain high interest rates in order to attract foreign capital, and efforts to sterilize the inflow of foreign capital (also requiring high interest rates) lead to increasing public internal debt and also a deteriorating fiscal balance, as it was the case of the experience of the main Latin American countries.
In this context, a larger and growing current account deficit will only be sustainable if equivalent levels of long-term external funding are available, associated with productive investment capable of generating a future flow of exchange revenues sufficient to pay off outstanding debt. The precise nature of capital inflow is fundamentally very important, since one of the great perils of stabilization plans with exchange rate anchors is that a reversal in the flow of foreign capital can lead to a balance-of-payments disequilibrium of such a magnitude that it becomes unfeasible for the government to maintain the existing exchange rate. Expectations for exchange rate devaluation are generated among international investors, leading in turn to further shrinkage in inflows of foreign capital and, consequently, a fall in levels of reserves, leaving the government no option but a substantial devaluation in the nominal exchange rate. This in turn may have a prejudicial effect on domestic prices.
Therefore, balance-of-payments disequilibrium (related to both current account deficits and capital account surplus) results from the fact that, in a world of globally mobile financial and productive capital investments, domestic stabilization policies are inherently destabilizing. This is because, under these conditions, the initially successful application of an internal stabilization policy comes to generate an endogenous process of deteriorating economic conditions (a growing public deficit, a growing deficit in its current account and dependence on foreign capital, among others), which may leave a country vulnerable to speculative attacks on its currency and thus subject to currency crises (Kregel, 1999) .
Summing up, the 1990s were marked by the economic openness (trade and financial), privatization of state-owned firms, and price stabilization with the use of exchange rate anchor. However, they were also characterized by the contagions of external crises under a context of high external vulnerability. The currency crises in Mexico (1994-95) , in Russia (1998) and in Brazil (1999) and the collapse of Argentina showed that the evidences of these economic policies were weak and, sometimes, contradictory. This sparked a debate among economists about the virtue, for instance, of financial liberalization and capital mobility. On the one hand, some political economists (Haggard and Webb, 2000) pointed to the absence of attention to institutions and argued that rule of law, a competent judicial and governability, among others, were necessary to assure stability and economic growth. On the other hand, Rodrik (1998) led the charge against blind support of liberalism and globalization arguing that particular policy approaches might work better than a dogmatic set of policies. Going in this direction, Stiglitz (2002) suggested a number of economic policies and reforms, a 'postWashington Consensus', which were more likely to produce sustainable and equitable development.
The main outcome of this debate is that, on the one hand, according to the conventional view, implementing a free-floating exchange rate regime and ample capital mobility, even when backed by responsible or credible economic policy, in line with the Washington Consensus prescriptions, leaves emerging economies prone to the short-term logic of capital accumulation. The conventional argument on the difficulties facing such economies is to attribute the volatility of foreign financing to the irresponsible economic policies they adopt (Caramazza and Aziz, 1998) . On the other hand, the heterodox view regards floating exchange rate regime and high capital mobility as a destabilizing combination of factors that intensify exchange rate crises in developing countries (Ferrari-Filho and Paula, 2006) .
After the 1990s currency crises, some important Latin American countries adopted a regime of macroeconomic policy inspired by the 'New Consensus Brazil, with the introduction of the Real Plan's, in July 1994, adopted an active crawling peg exchange rate regime, in which the nominal exchange rate was devaluated on a more or less fixed value: the exchange rate depreciated about 0.6-0.7% per month on average (Ferrari-Filho and Paula, 2003) . After the Brazilian currency crisis, in January 1999, the government authorities implemented a floating exchange rate regime.
Argentina and Venezuela did not adopt the 'New Consensus Macroeconomics' policies. Argentina that had implemented the Convertibility Plan in 1991 with a fixed exchange rate and a sort of currency board, after the 2001-02 crisis and a huge exchange rate devaluation that followed the beginning of the crisis, began to make use of managing floating exchange rate regime that has aimed to maintain the real exchange rate in a competitive level. 5 Venezuela, since January 2002, has implemented a fixed dual exchange rate system of the bolivar. 6 Mexico had before the December 1994 crisis a pegged exchange rate regime, where the peso exchange rate was stuck at the upper limit of a band. Started from the end of 1994, a floating rate policy has been maintained by the government, with Central Bank of Mexico intervening in the foreign exchange market under exceptional circumstances to minimize volatility and ensure an orderly market. However, since 1999 Mexico has Mexico has opted for a 'cleaner float', that is a pure flexible exchange rate. Chile also has operated a floating exchange regime, but the government intervenes massively in the currency markets through the stabilization funds. 4 Latin American countries that adopted inflation targeting regime (ITR) plus floating exchange rate system implemented an institutional arrangement of ITR that includes a range for the inflation target, the use of the headline inflation index as reference and the calendar year as commitment horizon. 5 According to Frenkel and Rapetti (2010) , the Central Bank of Argentina, however, never made an explicit statement regarding the existence of a real exchange rate target.
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The new system offered a 2.6 bolivar per dollar rate for imports of essential items such as food, medicine, and industrial machinery, and a 4.3 bolivar per dollar rate for imports of other products, including cars and telephones. Comision de Administracion de Divisas (CADIVI), the government body which administers currency exchange, continues as the only administrator of the foreign currencies and executor of this devaluation. As is well known, the 'New Consensus Macroeconomics' maintains that the main focus of the economic policy is price stabilization, and that inflation targeting regime is the best arrangement for economic policy, as it provides some freedom degrees to accommodate output fluctuations due to non-anticipated shocks (Bernanke et al, 1989) . Under such arrangement, fiscal policy is no longer viewed as a powerful macroeconomic instrument, and should be aligned and subordinated to monetary policy (Mishkin, 2000) . Monetary policy is a flexible instrument for achieving medium-term stabilization objectives, in that it can be adjusted quickly in response to macroeconomic developments. In most Latin American economies that adopted the inflation targeting regime, this macroeconomic arrangement has been characterized by a sort of tripod of economic policy: floating exchange regime, inflation target regime, and generation of primary fiscal surplus in order to achieve long-term fiscal equilibrium 7 . A certain and moderate autonomy of economic policy (for domestic purposes) is achieved under the context of capital account convertibility due to the working of a floating exchange rate regime.
One should be careful in the adoption of the 'New Consensus Macroeconomics' style of economic policy in emerging economies, as it can inhibit some necessary flexibility in the economic policy and at the same time can constrain economic growth.
7 Primary fiscal surplus is understood as necessary to enable government to pay interest expenses related to public debt. (Paula and Ferrari-Filho, 2010) . Economic authorities have to face some policy dilemmas. One potential dilemma is that inflation and exchange rate developments can be such that they call for opposite monetary policy action. For instance, using monetary policy to counter adverse exchange rate movements may jeopardize the inflation target, although frequently, in emerging economies, inflation target have in practice responded with some flexibility to the various challenges posed by exchange rate fluctuations, using not only monetary policy (Ho and McCauley, 2003) . Mohanty and Scatigna (2005) report that a number of emerging economies relied on interest rate interventions to stem exchange rate volatility. The solution of some dilemmas of economic policy in emerging economies could be solved by the use of non-traditional tools of economic policy, such as credit controls and capital controls.
To sum up, the above debate suggests that the financial liberalization and capital mobility did not produce stability and sustainable economic growth that were expected while less liberalized systems grew more robustly in a context of price and external stability. 10 The availability of international reserves reduced the default risk of public and private debts due to the lack of international liquidity in case of a sudden stop, and at the same time provide extra to the central banks instruments to intervene in the foreign exchange market (Frenkel and Rapatti, 2011) .
FIGURE 4
There was a marked reduction in the external vulnerability of the emerging economies during the 2000s due to the combination of massive self-insurance through foreign reserve accumulation, the reduction in the public external debt, the implementation of flexible exchange rate regime that allows to absorb external shocks, and the development of domestic financial markets which made some governments less dependent on external financing (Ocampo, 2012) . Despite significant accumulation of international reserves, with the levels before the crisis quickly restored, real exchange rate has in most cases appreciated back to precrisis level or even more. Figure 5 shows that the current account to GDP ratio decreased in 2010-11 due to both rise in the imports and in the current account' incomes services, but has not reached critical levels. Argentina. Figure 6 presents the public external debt to Latin America countries and the main emerging economies of the region.
FIGURE 6
The contagious of the 2007-08 international financial crisis in Latin America, in terms of GDP growth rate, was deep, short and synchronized, as can be seen in Figure   7 . Indeed, not only Latin America, but all the other regions of the world recovered quickly. All the major Latin American economies, with the exception of Venezuela, recovered sharply in 2010. (Jará et al., 2008, p. 57) . However, although the size of the exchange rate adjustment was very large, its effects were limited, due to the widespread use of flexible exchange rate regimes and lower currency mismatches.
In the case of the major economies of Latin America, in most countries the reduction of public external debt, the previous policy of international reserves accumulation and the reduction and improvement in the composition of public debt (increase of domestically-denominated debt) provided some policy space for countercyclical and stabilization policies. Actually the combination of the reduction of public external debt (external liabilities) with the increase in the foreign reserves (external assets) meant that most countries had a positive net balance in foreign currencies, so that the immediate and direct impact of the exchange rate devaluation on the public finance was positive, instead of negative -as it was the case in other previous occasions. Consequently, governments could make use of some countercyclical fiscal policy to face to effects of the financial crisis, when in other occasions they made use of tightened policies. As can be seen in Figure 8 Although the improvement in the terms of trade can be contributed to the appreciation of the currency, the strong currency appreciation in Brazil and Colombia was clearly associated with capital inflows, under an environment of exuberance in international financial markets. In both countries exchange rate appreciation has contributed to the deterioration of the current account. Brazil was one of the emerging 15 Mexico has REER similar to the real exchange rate bilateral with United States due to the high concentration of trade with this country. 16 The maintenance of a competitive exchange rate requires the build-up of foreign reserves during upturn be matched by measures to sterilize their monetary impact -that is why fiscal surplus is essential complement to this sort of policy, what has been relaxed more recently in Argentina. 17 According to Bresser-Pereira (2008) , "Dutch disease is a market failure resulting from the existence of cheap and abundant natural resources used to produce commodities which are compatible with a more appreciated exchange rate than the one that would be necessary to make competitive the other tradable industries. By using cheap resources, the respective commodities cause the appreciation of the exchange rate because they can be profitable at a rate which is incompatible with the rate that other goods using the best technology available worldwide require" (p. 50).
countries that had a stronger trend of currency appreciation until February 2012, due to the combination of huge capital inflows, the commodities boom, high domestic interest rate, and the existence of a sophisticated and deep foreign exchange derivatives market totally open to foreign investors that provides space for speculation on the exchange rate. However, since the beginning of March 2012, due to, basically, the effects of the European crisis, the real has been devaluated.
Large capital inflows can help to reduce the cost of capital, but also can complicate macroeconomic management. Current account deficit widened more recently in the region (1.4% of GDP on average in 2011, according to ECLAC, 2011), due to increase in imports and income deficit, but still is not so high, and can be managed as the economies have combined a flexible exchange rate, with low external indebtedness and foreign reserves accumulation.
The degree of sterilized foreign exchange interventions has varied among countries. As we have seen in section 2, these interventions can allow countries to manage exchange rate volatility, while allowing keeping monetary aggregates under control in order to determine the short-term interest rate. Sterilized intervention has been used in Brazil and Peru as a dominant line of response against surging inflows, in order to smooth exchange rate volatility and slowing the rate of appreciation at least in the short term (IMF, 2011a, p.26) . Sterilization costs, however, is high in some countries that have high domestic interest rate as it has been the case of Brazil, and can pose a constraint especially where fiscal positions are already weak. Rodrik (2003) argues that if sterilization costs are high, it can be the case of using alternatively capital controls in order to face the consequences of the surge of capital inflows.
In the face of rapid exchange rate appreciation, Brazil reinstated the Tax on The IOF was too low to stem the derivatives carry trade due to its high leverage degree, and private agents found loopholes to circumvent the regulations. One of the main channels of circumvention after October 2010 was the increase in bank's short dollar positions in the spot currency market. In fact, the IOF on portfolio inflows encouraged the build-up of long real/short dollar positions in the on-shore derivatives market, that is, the derivatives carry trade supported by resident banks which take the other side of non-resident investors in the derivatives market. For more details, see banks' short foreign exchange positions in the cash market) and, mainly, after July 2011 (when the Brazilian government adopted a broader regulation of the foreign exchange derivatives operations) a more comprehensive regulation has been launched, encompassing both capital controls, prudential financial regulation and foreign exchange derivatives market regulation. Table 3 summarizes the main measures related to capital account regulation and derivatives market regulation after the global financial crisis in Brazil. 
Capital controls
The Ministry of Finance implemented a 2% of IOF on nonresident equity and fixed income portfolio inflows.
October 2010
Capital controls (i) IOF increased from 2 to 4 percent for fixed income portfolio investments and equity funds.
(ii) IOF increased to 6 percent for fixed income investments. (iii) Limitations were also introduced on the ability of foreign investors to shift investment from equity to fixed income investment.
Derivatives Market Regulation (i) IOF on margin requirements on foreign exchange derivative transactions increased from 0.38 percent to 6 per cent.
(ii) Loopholes for IOF on margin requirements were closed: foreign investors in the futures markets were no longer allowed to meet their margin requirements via locally borrowed securities or guarantees from local banks, which allowed them to avoid payment of the tax.
January 2011

Prudential financial regulation
Non-interest reserve requirement equivalent to 60 percent of bank's short dollar positions in the foreign exchange spot market that exceed USD 3 billion or their capital base, whichever is smaller (to be implemented over 90 days). (ii) 6 percent IOF extended for both new and renewed foreign loans with maturities of up to 2 years.
July 2011
Prudential financial regulation
The Non-interest reserve requirement became mandatory for amounts over USD 1 billion or their capital base (whichever is smaller).
Derivatives ( Peru also introduced a wide range of measures to tackle rapid capital inflows, and upward pressure on the exchange rate. Among other measures, in July 2010 government implemented additional capital requirements for foreign exchange credit risk exposure, and in September 2010, reserve requirements were raised, including 120% reserve requirement for nonresidents' deposits in domestic currency. The highly restrictive reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency deposits and active intervention have helped maintain low exchange rate volatility and restrain credit growth in Peru (IMF, 2011a, p.31) .
In Venezuela, due to the possibility that an inflationary shock might result from the global trend towards exchange rate devaluations, the monetary authorities adopted an essentially restrictive monetary policy characterized by high basic interest rates and higher levels of compulsory deposits to be held by banks, which reduced liquidity and credit in the economy. More recently Venezuelan Government decided to control the exchange rate, to avoid the "exchange rate pass-through" mechanism, and continue as the only administrator of the foreign currencies and executor of this devaluation. Indeed, high level of inflation in Venezuela has resulted in some difficulties for the economic authorities to avoid the appreciation of REER.
Some authors (Bresser-Pereira, 2008; Frenkel and Rapetti, 2011) have warned of the risks of a sustained trend of exchange rate appreciation in countries like Brazil and other Latin American economies: it can lead to the end of industrial firms and the destruction of human capital, technical and entrepreneurial know-how, horizontal and vertical integration with other firms, and reduction of the access to external trade markets. Real exchange rate appreciation and the contraction of industrial sector can have negative consequences to the long-term growth of the economies. Indeed in semimatured countries that constituted a manufacturing sector, a trend of real exchange rate appreciation can translate in a gradual process of reduction of the aggregate value of industrial sector and industrial employment -an effect that can only be felt in the long term (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2011) . Indeed, it can be the case that some of the Latin American economies may be going through a sort of 'early de-industrialization' 19 .
Furthermore, there is some evidence that show that Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru have been in a process of 'primary sector exports priorization' 20 , that is the economies become specialized in exporting commodities goods that have natural comparative advantage, while at the same time they reduce the share of manufacturing good in total exports.
Summary and Conclusions
Capital flows have been volatile and with a pro-cyclical behavior in Latin America, following a pattern that has been described in the literature on capital flows. In particular, we have seen that capital flows to Latin America have been mostly
19 Classic de-industrialization is seen in the literature as a secular decline in the share of manufacturing employment in the advanced economies, in part due to the shift in domestic expenditure from manufacturing to services caused by the increase in the average per capita income. For more, see Rowthourn and Ramaswamy (1997) . 20 This process is also called as 're-primarization'. there is some concern that some Latin American economies may be going through a sort of 'early de-industrialization', due to the currency appreciation caused by the 'Dutch disease' that resulted from the commodities boom.
Two lines of thought crystallize out from the 2007-08 international financial crisis. On the one hand, as highlighted by Prates and Cintra (2009) , in previous crisesmore particularly the contagious of the currency crises of the 1990s (Mexico, 1994-95; East Asia, 1997; Russia, 1998; and Brazil, 1998-99) On the other hand, unlike the financial and exchange rate crises of the 1990s, where the emerging economies suffered more from the repercussions on the economy, the economic impacts of the present crisis have been much more damaging to the developed economies.
Finally, massive capital inflows -in consequence of large capital inflows in the form of both FDI and portfolio investment, fuelled by interest rate spreads between markets in the region and in developed economies -have put some macroeconomic problems in the main emerging countries of the region, including exchange rate appreciation and quick increase in domestic credit. The relevant question is: What to do in the face of massive capital inflows? Capital controls can be useful tool as a complement of macroeconomic policy, but in order to be effective they need to be comprehensive and should be dynamically adjusted to compensate the tendency of financial markets to elude them. Capital account regulations should be seen as an essential part to the macroeconomic policy toolkit and not seen as measures of last resort. In particular, during the boom periods, they can help authorities to manage economic policy by avoiding exchange rate appreciation, the risks associated with rising current account deficits and useless foreign exchange reserve accumulation.
Furthermore, for multiplicity of policy objectives -economic growth, reduction of external vulnerability and financial stability, among others -economic authorities 
